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Reference-Frame-Independent quantum key distribution (RFI-QKD) is known to be robust against
slowly varying reference frames. However, other QKD protocols such as BB84 can also provide
secrete keys if the speed of the relative motion of the reference frames is slow enough. While there
has been a few studies to quantify the speed of the relative motion of the reference frames in RFI-
QKD, it is not yet clear if RFI-QKD provides better performance than other QKD protocols under
this condition. Here, we analyze and compare the security of RFI-QKD and BB84 protocol in the
presence of the relative motion of the reference frames. In order to compare their security in real
world implementation, we also consider the QKD protocols with decoy state method. Our analysis
shows that RFI-QKD provides more robustness than BB84 protocol against the relative motion of
the reference frames.
PACS numbers: 42.25.-p, 03.67.Ud, 03.67.-a, 42.50.Ex
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) promises enhanced
communication security based on the laws of quantum
physics [1, 2]. Since the first QKD protocol has been
introduced in 1984, there has been a lot of theoretical
and experimental effort to improve the security and the
practicality of QKD [3, 4]. These days, QKD research is
not only limited in laboratories [5–9] but also in indus-
tries [10].
In general, QKD requires a shared common reference
frame between two communicating parties, Alice and
Bob. For example, the interferometric stability or the
alignment of the polarization axes are required for fiber
based QKD using phase encoding and polarization en-
coding free-space QKD, respectively. However, it can be
difficult and costly to maintain the shared reference frame
in real world implementation. For instance, it is highly
impractical to establish a common polarization axes in
earth-to-satellite QKD due to the revolution and rotation
of the satellite with respect to the ground station [11–17].
A recently proposed reference-frame-independent
QKD (RFI-QKD) provides an efficient way to bypass this
shared reference frame problem [18]. In RFI-QKD, Al-
ice and Bob share the secrete keys via a decoherence-free
basis while check the communication security with other
bases. Both free-space [19] and telecom fiber [20, 21]
based RFI-QKD have been successfully implemented. It
is remarkable that the concept of the reference frame
independent can be applied to measurement-device-
independent QKD [22, 23].
∗ tanu.pra99@gmail.com
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Unlike to its name, however, the security of the origi-
nal theory of RFI-QKD is guaranteed when the relative
motion of the reference frames is slow comparing to the
system repetition rate [18]. If the reference frames of Al-
ice and Bob are deviated with a fixed angle, however, one
can easily compensate the deviation and implement an
ordinary QKD protocol. Therefore, the effectiveness of
RFI-QKD over other QKD protocols becomes clear when
there is rapid relative motion of the reference frames dur-
ing the QKD communication. There has been few studies
to quantify the speed of the relative motion of the refer-
ence frames in RFI-QKD [24, 25]. Without the perfor-
mance comparison with other QKD protocols, however,
these studies do not show the effectiveness of RFI-QKD
over other QKD protocols.
In this paper, we report the security of RFI-QKD and
BB84 protocol in the presence of the relative motion of
the reference frames of Alice and Bob. In order to com-
pare the performances in real world implementation, we
also consider the decoy state method. By comparing the
security analyses, we found that RFI-QKD is more ro-
bust than BB84 protocol against the relative motion of
the reference frames.
II. QKD WITH A FIXED
REFERENCE FRAME DEVIATION
In this section, we review the security proof of RFI-
QKD and BB84 protocol with a fixed reference frame
deviation. A shared reference frame is required for both
fiber based QKD with phase and free-space QKD with
polarization encoding. It corresponds to the interfero-
metric stability and the polarization axes for fiber based
QKD and free-space QKD, respectively. In the following,
we will consider free-space QKD with polarization encod-
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2ing for simplicity. However, we note that our analysis is
also applicable for fiber based QKD with phase encoding.
A. RFI-QKD protocol
Figure 1 shows the polarization axes of Alice and Bob
with a deviation angle θ. Since Alice and Bob should face
each other in order to transmit the optical pulses, their
Z-axes, which corresponds to left- and right-circular po-
larization states, are always well aligned. On the other
hand, the relation of their X and Y -axes, which cor-
respond to linear polarization states such as horizontal,
vertical, +45◦, and −45◦ polarization states, depend on
θ. The relations of the polarization axes are
XB = XA cos θ + YA sin θ,
YB = YA cos θ −XA sin θ,
ZB = ZA, (1)
where the subscripts A and B denote Alice and Bob,
respectively.
In RFI-QKD, Alice and Bob share the secrete keys via
Z-axis, as it is unaffected by the polarization axes devi-
ation. In this basis, the quantum bit error rate (QBER)
becomes
QZZ =
1− 〈ZAZB〉
2
. (2)
Here, the subscripts ij where i, j ∈ {X,Y, Z} denote that
Alice sends a state in i basis while Bob measures it in
j basis. The probability distributions of the measure-
ment outcomes in X and Y -axes are used to estimate
the knowledge of an eavesdropper, Eve. Her knowledge
can be estimated by a quantity C which is defined as
C = 〈XAXB〉2 + 〈XA YB〉2 + 〈YAXB〉2 + 〈YA YB〉2. (3)
Note that the quantity C is independent of the deviation
angle θ. The knowledge of Eve is bounded by
IE [QZZ , C] = (1−QZZ)H
[
1 + u
2
]
+QZZH
[
1 + v
2
]
,
(4)
XB
YB
ZA = ZB
2δ
θ
YAXA
θ
2δ
FIG. 1. The polarization axes of Alice and Bob. θ and 2δ
denote the fixed angle deviation, and the range of the relative
motion of the polarizations axes, respectively.
where
u = min
[
1
1−QZZ
√
C
2
, 1
]
,
v =
1
QZZ
√
C
2
− (1−QZZ)2u2, (5)
and H [x] = −x log2 x−(1−x) log2(1−x) is the Shannon
entropy of x.
The secret key rate in the RFI-QKD protocol is given
by [18]
rRFI = 1−H [QZZ ]− IE [QZZ , C] . (6)
It is notable that Eq. (6) is independent of a fixed de-
viation rotation θ [18]. The security proof shows that
rRFI ≥ 0 for QZZ . 15.9%.
In practice, the effective quantum state that Bob re-
ceives from Alice can have errors due to the transmis-
sion noise and experimental imperfection. Assuming the
noise and the imperfection are polarization independent,
we can model the Bob’s receiving quantum state ρB as
ρB = pρA +
1− p
2
I, (7)
where ρA, 1−p and I are the state prepared by Alice, the
strength of noise, and a two dimensional identity matrix,
respectively. Note that 〈FAGB〉 can be written as a state
dependent form of 〈FAGB〉 = Tr[(FA ⊗ GB) · ρAB ] where
F ,G ∈ {X,Y, Z}, and ρAB = ρA ⊗ ρB . Therefore, the
QBER QZZ and the quantity C become
QZZ =
1− p
2
, (8)
C = 2 p2 = 2(1− 2QZZ)2. (9)
In this case, rRFI ≥ 0 for QZZ . 12.6%.
B. BB84 protocol
In this section, we consider the secrete key rate of BB84
with a fixed reference frame deviation. Due to the sym-
metry, the QBER of X, and Y -axes are the same, and
they are given as
QXX =
1− 〈XAXB〉
2
,
=
1− p cos θ
2
= QY Y . (10)
If Alice and Bob utilize X and Y axes, the overall QBER
QXY is
QXY =
1
2
(QXX +QY Y )
=
1
2
(1− p cos θ) . (11)
3Since we know that Z-axis is rotation invariant, one can
get lower QBER by using Z-axis instead of Y -axis. In
this case, the overall QBER QXZ is given by
QXZ =
1
2
(QXX +QZZ)
=
1
2
(
1− p cos2 θ
2
)
. (12)
The secrete key rate of BB84 with {X,Y }({X,Z})
bases is given by [3, 4]
r
XZ (XY )
BB84 = 1− 2H
[
QXZ (XY )
]
. (13)
Apparently, Eq. (13) is dependent on the reference frame
deviation θ. However, one can easily compensate the de-
viation if θ is invariant during the QKD communication.
For BB84 protocol, r
XZ (XY )
BB84 ≥ 0 for QZZ . 11% when
θ = 0.
III. QKD IN THE PRESENCE OF THE
RELATIVE MOTION OF REFERENCE FRAMES
In this section, we study the effect of the relative mo-
tion of the reference frames of Alice and Bob during the
QKD communication. Let us consider the case when θ
varies from −δ to δ as depicted in Fig. 1. For simplicity,
we assume that θ is centered at 0 and equally distributed
over θ ∈ [−δ, δ].
The quantities QXX , QY Y , and C are affected by the
relative motion of the reference frames. However, QZZ
is unchanged since ZA = ZB all the time. In order to
quantify the effect of the relative motion, we need to
calculate the average values of the observed quantities of
〈FAGB〉, which is given by
〈FAGB〉 = 1
2δ
∫ δ
−δ
〈FAGB〉dθ
=
sin 2δ
δ
〈FAGA〉. (14)
With Eq. (14), one can represent the quantity C as a
function of QZZ and δ,
C [QZZ , δ ] = 2(1− 2QZZ)2
(
sin 2δ
2δ
)2
. (15)
Therefore, one can estimate the secrete key rate of RFI-
QKD in the presence of the relative motion of the refer-
ence frames by inserting Eq. (8) and (15) to Eq. (6).
The average QBER QXX and QY Y are also presented
as a function of QZZ and δ, and they become
QXX [QZZ , δ ] = QY Y [QZZ , δ ]
=
1
2δ
∫ δ
−δ
1− 〈XAXB〉
2
dθ
=
1
2
− (1− 2QZZ) sin 2δ
4δ
. (16)
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FIG. 2. The lower bounds of the secrete key rates of RFI-QKD
and BB84 protocol with {X,Y }({X,Z}) bases with respect
to QZZ and δ.
Therefore, the average QBER QXY and QXZ become
QXY [QZZ , δ ] =
1
2
(QXX [QZZ , δ ] +QY Y [QZZ , δ ]) ,
=
1
2
− (1− 2QZZ) sin 2δ
4δ
. (17)
and
QXZ [QZZ , δ ] =
1
2
(QXX [QZZ , δ ] +QZZ [QZZ , δ ]) ,
=
1 + 2QZZ
4
− (1− 2QZZ) sin 2δ
8δ
. (18)
By inserting Eq. (17) or (18) to Eq. (13), one can esti-
mate the secrete key rate of BB84 either with {X,Y } or
{X,Z} bases in the presence of the relative motion of the
reference frames.
In Fig. 2, we compare the lower bounds of the se-
crete key rates for RFI-QKD and BB84 with {X,Y }
and {X,Z} bases with respect to QZZ and δ. It clearly
shows that RFI-QKD is more robust than BB84 protocol
against the channel depolarization as well as the relative
motion of the reference frames. In the case of BB84 pro-
tocol, one can obtain better results by using {X,Z} bases
instead of {X,Y } bases.
IV. RFI-QKD AND BB84 PROTOCOL USING
DECOY STATE METHOD
In this section, we apply the security analysis to a
real world implementation using weak coherent pulses
with decoy state method. In the following, we will con-
sider two decoy states method which is most widely used
for real world implementation [26]. According to this
method, Alice randomly modulates the intensity of the
weak coherent pulses with mean photon numbers per
pulse of µ, ν and and 0 where µ > ν. They are usu-
ally called signal, decoy and vacuum pulses, respectively.
4Assuming that the bases chosen by Alice and Bob are
i and j where i, j ∈ {X,Y, Z}, the lower bound of the
secrete key rate is given by [26, 27]
r = −Yµ H[Qij|µ] + µ yL1 exp[−µ] (1− IE) . (19)
where Yµ, and y
L
1 are the gain of signal pulses having
QBER Qij|µ, and the lower bound of the gain of single-
photon pulses, repectively. Here, we assume that the
error correction efficiency is unity. The values of Yµ and
Qij|µ can be obtained from the experiment, however, yL1
should be estimated with the decoy and vacuum pulses.
The lower bound of the gain of single-photon pulses is
given by [21]
yL1 =
µ2Yνe
ν − ν2Yµeµ −
(
µ2 − ν2)Y0
µ (µν − ν2) , (20)
where Yν and Y0 are the gain of decoy pulses and vacuum
pulses, respectively.
The QBER for signal state Qij|µ can be calculated by
using
YµQij|µ =
∞∑
n=0
yn
µn qn,ij
n!
exp[−µ], (21)
where yn, and qn,ij are the gains and QBER of n-photon
state, respectively. Here, Yµ and qn,ij are given as
Yµ =
∞∑
i=0
yi
µi
i!
exp [−µ] ,
= 1− exp [−η µ] + pd (22)
qn,ij =
eij ηn +
1
2pd
yn
, (23)
where η, pd, and eij denote the overall detection efficiency
including the channel transmission, the dark count prob-
ability, and the erroneous detection probability, respec-
tively. The detection efficiency of n-photon state ηn is
given by ηn = 1− (1− η)n where η can be represented in
terms of loss, L in dB and Bob’s detection efficiency, ηB
by η = ηB10
− L10 .
The deviation between the reference frames of Alice
and Bob contributes the erroneous detections, hence,
eij = Qij . Note that QXY =
1
2δ
∫ δ
−δ
1−〈XAYB〉
2 dθ =
1
2 ,
QY X =
1
2δ
∫ δ
−δ
1−〈YAXB〉
2 dθ =
1
2 , and Qii are given by
Eqs. (8), and (10).
According to the decoy theory, the upper bound of
QBER generated by single-photon states of the signal
pulses is given by [21]
qU1,ij|µ =
QµijYµ − 12Y0 exp[−µ]
µyL1 exp[−µ]
. (24)
The lower bound of QBER occurred due to single-photon
states of the signal pulses is given by
qL1,ij|µ = 1−
(1−Qµ ij)Yµ − 12Y0 exp[−µ]
µyL1 exp[µ]
. (25)
Here, we assume that the QBER of n-photon states for
n ≥ 2 is qn,ij = 1.
A. RFI-QKD protocol using decoy state
In the RFI-QKD scenario, the lower bound of the se-
crete key rate rRFI becomes [21]
rRFI = −Yµ H[QZZ|µ] + µ yL1 exp[−µ] (1− IE) . (26)
The upper bound of Eve’s information IE is given by
IE =
(
1− qU1,ZZ|µ
)
H
[
1 + umax
2
]
−qU1,ZZ|µH
[
1 + v
2
]
. (27)
where qU1,ZZ|µ given by Eq. (24), and
umax = min
[
1
1− qU1,ZZ|µ
√
CL1
2
, 1
]
,
v =
1
qU1,ZZ|µ
√
CL1
2
−
(
1− qU1,ZZ|µ
)2
u2max. (28)
Here, CL1 is the optimal lower bound of C for single-
photon states. The optimal lower bound CL1 is given
below [21]
CL1 = max[α, 2(α
′)2] + max[β, 2(β′)2], (29)
where
α =
∑
j=X,Y
(
1− 2 max (1/2, qL1µXj))2 ,
β =
∑
j=X,Y
(
1− 2 max (1/2, qL1µY j))2 ,
α′ =
(1.70711−QµXX −QµXY )Yµ − 0.70711Y0 exp[−µ]
µyL1
−0.70711,
β′ =
(1.70711−QµY X −QµY Y )Yµ − 0.70711Y0 exp[−µ]
µyL1
−0.70711. (30)
B. BB84 protocol using decoy state
For BB84 protocol, the lower bounds of the secret key
rate with {X, Z} ({X, Y }) basis is given as [26, 27]
r
XZ (XY )
BB84 = −Yµ H[QXZ|µ (XY |µ)] (31)
+µ yL1 exp[−µ]
(
1−H
[
qU
1,XZ|µ (1,XY |µ)
])
.
Note that qU
1,XZ|µ (1,XY |µ) is provided at Eq. (24), and
QXZ|µ and QXY |µ can be calculated with the help of
Eqs. (11), (12), (21), (22), and (23).
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FIG. 3. The lower bounds of the secrete key rates rRFI , r
XZ
BB84, and r
XY
BB84 with respect to loss (a) for ideal case of no noise or
p = 1, and (b) for more realistic case of the intrinsic QBER of QZZ = 3% or p = 0.94. The red, blue and green lines represent
rRFI , r
XZ
BB84, and r
XY
BB84, respectively. The solid, small-dashed, and dotted lines are for the range of the relative motion of the
reference frames δ = 0, pi
8
and pi
7
, respectively. For both cases, the secrete key rate of RFI-QKD is more robust than it of BB84
against the relative motion.
C. Result and discussion
Figure 3 shows the lower bounds of the secret key rates
of RFI-QKD and BB84 protocols with respect to loss.
For simulation, we choose Y0 = pd = 10
−6, µ = 0.5,
ν = 0.05, and ηB = 0.35 that are widely accepted for the
earth-to-satellite QKD scenario [16, 17].
Figure 3(a) shows the secrete key rates when there is
no intrinsic QBER due to the noise, i.e., p = 1. The
solid red, blue and green lines are for RFI-QKD, BB84
with {X,Z} and {X,Y } bases with δ = 0, respectively.
The dotted lines are for δ = pi7 . When there is no rel-
ative motion between the reference frames of Alice and
Bob, i.e., δ = 0, the secrete ket rates for all QKD proto-
cols are comparable. As the range of the relative motion
increases, however, the secrete key rate of BB84 with
{X,Y } basis rapidly decreases.
Figure 3(b) shows a more realistic case that there is
intrinsic QBER due to the noise and the experimental
imperfection. Here, we assume the intrinsic QBER of
QZZ = 3% which corresponds to p = 0.94. The solid,
small-dashed and dotted lines are for δ = 0, pi8 and
pi
7 , re-
spectively. It clearly shows that RFI-QKD outperforms
BB84 protocol in real world implementation. For exam-
ple, for p = 0.94, δ = pi7 , the maximum loss that QKD
communication is possible in RFI-QKD is reduced by
12% from the ideal case of p = 1, δ = 0. On the other
hand, the maximum loss for BB84 protocol using {X, Z}
and {X,Y } bases is reduced by 90% and 100% from the
ideal case, respectively.
V. CONCLUSIONS
To summary, we have studied both reference frame
independent quantum key distribution (RFI-QKD) and
BB84 protocol with the presence of the relative motion
between the reference frames of Alice and Bob. We have
also considered overall noise model with a depolarizing
channel between Alice and Bob. In order to compare
the secrete key rates in real world implementation, we
also have applied the security analyses to the decoy state
methods. We found that RFI-QKD provides more ro-
bustness than BB84 protocol in the presence of the rela-
tive motion between the reference frames.
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